Modern China and the Ancient Politics of Daoism
Original Chinese Language Text By: Fan Guangchun (樊光春)
(Translated by Adrian Chan-Wyles PhD)
Translator’s Note: For an old religion to be relevant in modern China, it must support the Socialist State and not stand in opposition to it. It is only when religion stands in opposition to progressive Socialism, that it becomes a class enemy. As far as Marxist-Engelism is concerned, theistic religion must not hold any form of State power due to its regressive theology. This is a point that Lenin recognised (‘religion is a private matter’), and which Stalin (and Mao) both accepted. Indeed, in its 1954 ‘Constitution’, Communist China guaranteed all its citizens the right to profess (or not profess) a religion, providing (mirroring Article 52 of the Soviet Constitution) that All religions remain independent of the State, and All schools independent of religion. According to this ‘Soviet’ definition, it is the Socialist State (and its functionaries) that are ‘atheistic’, and not necessarily the majority of the ordinary people living within that State. In this regard, religion is not to be directly attacked (where it supports the Socialist State), but allowed to continue within a secular and progressive State, whereby many of its feudalistic and pre-modern assumptions and superstitions will be shown to be superfluous within the framework of progressive Socialist reform and development. Marx and Engels, of course, critiqued the relevant religion in the West, namely that of the Judeo-Christian tradition, and it is debatable whether such a critique was ever intended to be literally applied to religious, spiritual and philosophical traditions that developed in China outside of historical Judeo-Christian influence. Confucianism, for instance, is a philosophy concerned more with social order and good behaviour than the worship pf gods, and Buddhism is a non-theistic, perceptual science (the dialectics of which Marx and Engels held in high regard), but what of Daoism? At its core, Daoism has a well-established foundation of medical knowledge that has been historically used to prevent illness and extend life-spans. As Daoism has its roots in China’s ancient past, it does possess certain theistic, or to be more exact ‘polytheistic’ tendencies, but it is its ‘naturalistic’ philosophy that remains its central and defining core. Religions (even theistic ones) can be accommodated within a Socialist or Communist State, despite a mistaken view amongst some leftists that all religion must be immediately wiped-out. It is the unfolding of Socialist science that will evolve religiously-minded individuals into modern Socialist beings, and not the forcible eradication of religious beliefs. On the other hand, should a religious movement take-up arms against a Socialist State, then that religion immediately transforms itself into a bourgeois class enemy of the people. Two examples of this divisive phenomena in modern China can be seen in the Pro-Tibetan Movement and the Falun Gong – both of which represent Western capitalist interests in China, and strive to bring-down the Socialist State. Daoism, however, is a unique ‘Chinese philosophy’ that has proven to be central to much, if not all, significant events throughout Chinese history. Today, all authentic Daoists in China are loyal to the Socialist State whilst propagating their particular philosophical path, and this translated article gives a ‘modern’ Chinese Daoist view of the world.
ACW 13.10.2016
ACW 13.10.2016
Do Daoists possess political beliefs? This question seems a little odd to contemporary Chinese ears, as we are taught from childhood that the fundamental premise for political belief is always linked to Communist theory and atheism, whilst religion is a product of idealism and feudal superstition. It has been further implied that these two systems are mutually exclusive and cannot be integrated in any meaningful way. However, this apparent dichotomy has come into question over the years, particularly when viewed in the light of recorded Daoist history, and the political dimension that Daoism undoubtedly possesses. When I asked an old Daoist master whether Daoism possesses political beliefs, he clearly answered ‘yes’. What is Daoist politics? He answered that the Daoist political concepts are those linked to Chapter 80 of the Dao De Jing (道德经), namely that of a ‘small country with a limited population’ (小国寡民 – Xiao Guo Gua Min), and the principle of ‘ruling through non-action’ (无为而治 – Wu Wei Er Zhi), also found throughout the Dao De Jing (Chapters 2, 3, 11, 29, 37, 43, 47, 48, 63, and 64 respectively). Therefore, Daoist politics can be summarised as follows:
1) The basic goals of national politics are to provide the people with ‘sufficient food, adequate clothing, secure homes, and a general sense of collective well-being’ (DDJ: Chapter 80). In modern language, this means ensuring the efficient economic development of the entire country so that everyone can benefit.
2) The authorities must ‘govern the country through loving the people’ (爱民治国 – Ai Min Zhi Guo) [DDJ: Chapter 10], just as the ‘sages have no thoughts or feelings of their own, but make the thoughts and feelings of the people their own’ (人无常心,以百姓心为心 – Sheng Ren Wu Chang Xin – Yi Bai Xing Xin Wei Xin) [DDJ: Chapter 49]. In this way, the people are freed of excessive desire and anxiety. (With an all-embracing mind, and an expansive ‘intention’ [意 – Yi], the sages serve the people.)
3) Government officials who are self-controlled and frugal, are respected because they ‘avoid all extremes, all excesses, and all extravagances’ (去甚、去奢、去泰 – Qu Shen Qu She Qu Tai) [DDJ: Chapter 29]. Furthermore, such people ‘do not value rare or expensive goods’ (不贵难得之货 – Bu Gui Nan De Zhi Huo) [DDJ: Chapter 3], and instead reject extravagance and excess, preferring a simple existence involving little or no wastage – what today might be considered a ‘low carbon’ emission lifestyle.
4) Adhere to the practices of ‘compassion, frugality, and not daring to strive (to be first in the world)’ (慈、俭、不争 – Ci Jian Bu Zheng) [DDJ: Chapter 67], as the foundation for social interaction.
5) Continuously strive for peace, and never strive for war. Therefore, it is said ‘weapons of war are not auspicious instruments, and those of superior character should avoid gathering and using such implements, unless there is no other recourse’ (兵者不祥之器,非君子之器,不得已而用之。 - Bing Zhe Bu Xiang Zhi Qi Fei Jun Zi Zhi Qi Bu De Yi Er Yong Zhi) [DDJ: Chapter 31].
6) As the ‘Dao is nothing other than the lawful unfolding of nature’ (道法自然 – Dao Fa Zi Ran) [DDJ: Chapter 25], this perhaps correlates with the modern concept of the ‘enlightened use of ecology’ (生态文明 – Sheng Tai Wen Ming)
Laozi explained the Dao of politics to his students in the Daoist text entitled ‘Grand Peace Classic’ (太平经 – Tai Ping Jing) which elaborates on the political principles found in Laozi’s ‘Way Virtue Classic’ (道德经 – Dao De Jing), as a means to suggest various reforms designed to achieve the ‘Grand Peace’ here and now, relevant to the society of the time within which it was wrote. This process began during the 1st century CE, through the activities of the Daoist Gan Zhongke (甘忠可), who presented the ‘Grand Peace Classic’ to the Han Court. The emperor’s attention, however, was diverted from listening to Gan Zhongke because of court intrigue, and he was persuaded by scheming officials that Gan Zhongke was planning to ‘commit treason’, and so had him imprisoned (and eventually murdered) for his efforts. Later, a group of Daoist priests (the disciples of Gan Zhongke) continued to carefully propagate ‘Taiping’ political approaches at Court, in the hope that a Daoist influence could be established in the future. This accumulated effort eventually gained fruition, as the 13th Western Han Emperor Aidi (哀帝) finally converted to Daoism. This was achieved by court officials sympathetic to Daoism, allowing these Daoist priests to attend to the emperor whilst treating his illnesses (during which times they discussed and explained ‘Taiping’ concepts to him). However, despite the emperor’s whole-hearted support for Daoism and the politics of the ‘Grand Peace’, the more conservative elements of the Han nobility remain sceptical about this approach, and ensured – through court intrigues – that none of the policies could be enacted in reality. Therefore, despite the success of convincing the emperor, the time was not yet right for the application of ‘Taiping’ philosophy, with regard to the governing of the State.
Daoism did not disappear at this time during the late Western Han Dynasty, but instead continued to grow and develop the ideas of the ‘Taiping’ in the form of the ‘Five Pecks of Rice’ (五斗米 – Wu Duo Mi) movement, and the three major sects (三大教派 – San Da Jiao Pai), all of which were developed in remote areas, away from large populated areas (and official scrutiny). The Taiping Movement held aloft the banner of the ‘Taiping Classic’, and rallied the (Daoist practising) farmers of North China, in an armed uprising that attempted to cease control of the central government. As fate decreed, this revolutionary action, despite some early successes, ultimately ended in defeat. However, Zhang Lu (张鲁) and his Five Pecks of Rice Movement did manage to establish an independent ‘Taiping’ Daoist State in the area of Southern Shaanxi and Northern Sichuan. He implemented the people’s direct self-government, in a system that had no fixed or careerist ‘officials’. Instead, the people were trained to be self-sufficient and take care of their own official and personal needs (without recourse to consulting a hierarchy). This included becoming proficient in demographics and the application of a fair system of taxation used to benefit the entirety of society – and not just the nobility. This new Daoist system advocated economic self-sufficiency, with everything being produced within this State because there was a communal need for it. This involved sharing responsibility for the production of goods, and the fair distribution of those goods being the norm. The draconian rule of law was replaced by the practice of enlightened Daoist Virtue (道德 – Dao De) which involved the abolition of the death penalty. The fundamental characteristics of these ‘Taiping’ State where rule by ‘virtue’ (德 – De), ‘sincere integrity’ (诚信 - Cheng Xin), ‘natural compliance’ (守规 – Shou Gui), ‘equality of the people’ (人人平等 – Ren Ren Ping Deng), and ‘egalitarianism’ (平均主义 – Ping Jun Zhu Yi). This experimental Daoist State lasted for thirty years, before being destroyed by the forces of Cao Cao (曹操). The great leader – Chairman Mao – twice spoke highly of the ‘Five Pecks of Rice’ movement and its experimentation with a natural form of communisation, at the Central Workers Conference. In fact, this was the basis behind China’s experimentation with the people’s commune system, (although, of course, this turned-out not to be effective in the long run).
This Daoist approach appears to have transcended political elites and vested interest groups (a facet of modern Chinese society), but in reality remained a type of advanced and progressive consumption politics. After-all, Daoism was then very much a religious movement with religious structures, that were probably not designed to successfully run a country in the long-term. In any case, Daoism has subsequently undergone a profound transformation since those early days, where the emphasis switched to the philosophy of Laozi’s ‘Three Lives’ (三生 – San Sheng) thinking – namely ‘life force’ (生命 – Sheng Ming), ‘Life Attitude’ (生态 – Sheng Tai) [often translated as sustainable ‘ecology’, or acting in accordance (or balance) with nature], and ‘Supporting Life’ (养生 – Yang Sheng) [that is following physical and psychological practises that continuously ‘rejuvenate’ the life force and other essential substances] as a means to cultivate and achieve Spiritual Immortality (神仙 – Shen Xian).
Laozi’s political ideals, as expressed through his Daoist teachings, appear to possess an emotional appeal that manifests in society generation after generation. Generally speaking, there are two ways in which Daoist political ideals are expressed as:
a) Ten directions self-cultivation forest tradition (十方丛林 – Shi Fang Cong Lin) sees Daoist temples scattered throughout China, not far from important political and cultural centres. This allowed Daoist priests to exercise (or not) influence over the non-Daoist political system, should circumstances permit.
b) A highly developed Daoist practitioner has developed an influence in the world like that of a ‘Prime Minister’ but one resides deep in the remote hills, far away from society (山中宰相 – Shan Zhong Zai Xiang), and who possesses the appropriate power of virtue to ‘issue a single word that stops all killing’ (一言止杀 – Yi Yan Zhi Sha).
Example ‘a’ was used extensively by the ‘Taiping’ movement and the Five Pecks of Rice school. The idea was that by close association with those in society, the Taiping ideas could be slowly but surely transmitted, and therefore effect the political direction of society. However, Daoist organisation on the ground were limited to the administration of the Daoist temples as religious institutions, a form of organisation that could not easily be transplanted into the non-Daoist (Confucian) political structures, or indeed exercise very much influence over the life of the laity. Instead, the Taiping political agenda remained limited to such aspirations as ‘isolated self-cultivation to perfect (mind) and body’ (独善其身 – Du Shan Qi Shen), whilst ignoring such established ideals as ‘harmoniously uniting all beings in the world’ (世界大同 – Shi Jie Da Tong). Needless to say, experimentation in Taiping governance remained limited to Daoist ideals, as the Daoist system of government correlated the strength of personal inner virtue (of the leader), with political stability in the outer world. If the inner virtue was ‘weak’, then the structures of outer government would also be ‘weak’ and calamity would surely follow. This is why such accomplished Daoists as Tao Hongjing (陶弘景) and Qiu Chuji (丘处机) advocated the practice of quiet self-cultivation, but were willing to take a certain type of ‘non-direct (or ‘non-conflicting’) action in times of social upheaval (or natural calamity), as a means to save the country’ (曲线救国 – Qiu Xian Jiu Guo). This is in effect the use of indirect, subtle, constant, but otherwise often difficult to discern strategies and tactics in the physical world, designed to solve a myriad of problems. In military affairs, such an approach may be likened to the practice of guerrilla warfare, where small numbers of soldiers avoid direct contact with the enemy, but use quietness and subterfuge to successfully circle around points of strength, and inflict relatively small defeats here and there, until the enemy is permanently weakened through attrition. In recent times, this approach was successfully employed during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), with films being made about its ingenuity and resourcefulness against a materially superior enemy. (As found within the internal martial art of Taijiquan, this is the use of a ‘rounded’ technique that never directly conflicts with ‘linear’ strength, but undermines its power by constantly outmanoeuvring, or out-flanking it - Translator). In fact, this type of approach has been used by the Chinese people for centuries and its influence can be seen during the end of the Qing Dynasty and the revolutionary action pursued by Daoist Master Gong Haoren (龚皓然) in the Baoji area of Shaanxi province, as well as during the Anti-Japanese War (where Daoists treated ill and wounded Chinese soldiers using acupuncture and magical spells, calling upon the spirit of the ‘Big Dipper’ [天罡 – Tian Gang] star constellation), and the Civil War. Later, after the founding of New China, this same Daoist approach was adjusted and modified for use during the period of peaceful reconstruction of the country. This history demonstrates without a doubt that those who followed Daoism whole-heartedly supported the patriotic cause of China throughout its many wars, trials and tribulations. It further demonstrates that the Daoist approach to life (and politics) is both honest and respectable. This short list of Daoist activities offers concrete examples of how the Daoist religion does indeed possess a clear political aspect, does it not? The Daoist authorities in China today emphasise ‘love of country and love of religion’ (爱国爱教 – Ai Guo Ai Jiao). This approach of conviction unites the preservation of the Socialist State with the preservation of the Daoist religion and philosophy. Daoists loving their religion is strictly a faith-based religious attribute, but Daoists loving China is strictly an important political belief and exercise of genuine patriotism. Therefore, it may be stated that the ‘conviction’ that values the Daoist tradition, is exactly the same ‘conviction’ that manifests in the love of country – in essence the two attributes are not different, despite religion and politics being two very different subjects. In other words, a common ground that unites old religion and progressive politics can be found in the attitudes of ‘belief’ and ‘support’.
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©opyright: Adrian Chan-Wyles (ShiDaDao) 2016.
Original Chinese Source Language Text: http://mt.sohu.com/20151015/n423324631.shtml
道士有没有政治信仰
道教徒有没有政治信仰?这个问题好像有点怪异。因为我们从小被灌输的基本概念是:在当代中国,政治信仰总是与共产主义和无神论相联系,而宗教则是同唯心主义、封建迷信相挂钩,两个体系相互对立,不可融合。
近些年开始对这个概念产生怀疑,因为从阅读的大量历史文献和实际接触的道教中人来看,似乎并非如此。
于是,首先向道教的老师——老子提问:您老人家有政治信仰吗?
回答是:有。
您的政治信仰是什么呢?
答:小国寡民,无为而治。
您关于政治的基本观点有哪些?
答:
第一,国家政治的基本目标是使老百姓“甘其食,美其服,安其居,乐其俗”。拿你们现代人的流行词语就是努力建设小康社会。
第二,为政者要“爱民治国”,“圣人无常心,以百姓心为心”,想民众之所想,急民众之所急(全心全意为人民服务,或许也是老子他老人家的未尽之言)。
第三,推崇节俭吏治,“去甚、去奢、去泰”,“不贵难得之货”,反对铺张浪费,提倡低碳生活。第四,持守“慈、俭、不争”的社会风尚。第五,要和平不要战争,“兵者不祥之器,非君子之器,不得已而用之。”第六,“道法自然”——这大概类似于我们所说的“生态文明”。大略如此。
有了老子的答案,他的学生——道教是否有政治信仰就迎刃而解了。
在道教的第一部经典《太平经》里面,以《道德经》中的政治思想为基础,针对当时的社会弊病,提出了一系列改革措施,力图实现“太平”之世。起初,一批道教徒私相传授这部经典,希望有朝一日能影响到朝廷。但是,这些信息非但没有传递到皇上的头脑,既得利益集团还以“涉嫌谋反”的名义,把作者甘忠可关押起来,谋害致死。甘忠可的弟子们不服,他们联合朝廷中的同志,利用皇上疾病缠身的机会,终于把《太平经》的观点灌进皇上的耳朵,使得西汉的第十三个皇帝哀帝成为第一个宣布皈依道教的皇帝。可是,这批道教精英急于求成,过早地提出了改良朝政的主张,遭到改革对手的强力反弹,终归失败。
当时道教并没有因为西汉后期这起事件而销声匿迹,反而更加发展壮大,形成太平、五斗米、缅匿三大教派。太平道高举《太平经》的旗帜,发动北方广大地域内信奉道教的农民,举行武装起义,计划夺取中央政权,结果,还是失败的命运。而张鲁的五斗米道割据于今陕南川北地区,实行人民自治,不设官吏,由教职人员负责人口统计和税收;经济自给自足,生活部分供给制;道德教化为主、法制为辅,不施死刑。其基本特点是以德治国、诚信守规、人人平等、平均主义。这种改革试验持续30年,后来被曹操以武力终止。伟大领袖毛主席曾两次在中央工作会议上高度评价五斗米道在这一带有共产主义性质的试验,并把它作为我国人民公社化制度的历史依据(结果,东施效颦,失败了)。
当时一再发生的这些政改事件,其所以都未能成功,最根本原因恐在于超出了同时代政治精英和既得利益集团的承受能力,是一种超前的政治消费行为。另外,道教毕竟是一个宗教组织,它可能从本质上就难以承担起治国的重任。无论如何,从此之后,道教出现了重大的转型。从制度层面上再不干预政治了,而是着力深化和实践老子的“三生”思想——生命、生态和养生,专心培养神仙。
老子的政治理想对于道教来说,始终是挥之不去的情结,不甘心就这样退出。于是,有了两种变通的方式:一是十方丛林,二是“山中宰相”和“一言止杀”。其中丛林制就是吸取太平道和五斗米道以建立政权为手段而实现理想的教训,认识到宗教组织作用在社会管理中的局限性,改而在小范围内进行试验,建立一个个宗教理想俱乐部,不求“世界大同”,但求“独善其身”。而陶弘景、丘处机的个人行为,也能在乱世之中“曲线救国”。
最近读到茅山道教在抗日战争中的义举,可歌可泣。又有陕西宝鸡道士龚皓然历清末革命、抗日战争、国内战争和新中国成立后的和平建设时期,以天罡神针为抗日将士和民众治伤疗疾,爱国报国的拳拳之心矢志不渝,最后冤死于恶政年代,诚为可敬可叹。
综上数例,难道不是道教徒的政治信仰吗?
当政眼下强调的“爱国爱教”,其中实已蕴含着了宗教界的两种信仰,爱教是各自的宗教信仰,爱国就是共同的政治信仰;由此也不难推演出这样的结论:政治信仰与宗教信仰并非冰炭不同炉。
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(文/樊光春)